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Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc.,
114 S.CT. 1023 (1994).
Introduction
Fantasy, Inc. ("Fantasy"), the holder of a copyright for a song, brought an
infringement action against John Fogerty ("Fogerty"), the musician who original-
ly wrote the song. After his successful defense of the action, Fogerty moved for
attorney's fees pursuant to § 505 of the Copyright Act. The United States Dis-
trict Court for the Northern District of California denied the motion. It held that
although prevailing plaintiffs are routinely awarded attorney's fees, prevailing
defendants must show that the original suit was frivolous. The United States
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed. The United States Supreme
Court reversed and remanded, holding that successful plaintiffs and successful
defendants must be treated alike under § 505.
Facts
John Fogerty was the lead singer and songwriter for the musical group
"Creedence Clearwater Revival." In 1970, he wrote the song "Run Through The
Jungle," and sold the publishing rights to Fantasy, Inc. In 1985, after the group
disbanded, Fogerty wrote the song "The Old Man Down the Road." Fantasy, Inc.
sued Fogerty for copyright infringement alleging that "The Old Man Down The
Road" was merely "Run Through The Jungle" with new words. The jury found
in favor of Fogerty.
After defeating the infringement claim, Fogerty moved for reasonable attor-
ney's fees pursuant to § 505 of the Copyright Act.' The district court interpreted
the language of § 505 to require the application of a "dual standard" to the issue
of attorney's fees. Under this standard, prevailing plaintiffs are awarded
attorney's fees as a matter of course, but prevailing defendants must show that
the original infringement action was frivolous or brought in bad faith. The dis-
trict court ruled that Fantasy, Inc.'s infringement suit was not brought in bad
faith and therefore denied Fogerty's motion. Fogerty appealed.
The court of appeals affirmed the district court's application of the "dual
standard." It refused to adopt the "evenhanded approach" followed by other
circuit courts. Under the "evenhanded approach," attorney's fees are awarded to
successful plaintiffs and successful defendants on the same basis, i.e. the court's
discretion. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to settle the conflict among the
I. "In any civil action under this title, the court in its discretion may allow the recovery of full
costs by or against any party other than the United States or an officer thereof. Except as otherwise
provided by this title, the court may also award a reasonable attorney's fee to the prevailing party as
part of the costs." 17 U.S.C. § 505.
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appellate courts.
Legal Analysis
The issue before the Supreme Court was whether attorneys fees in a copyright
infringement action should be awarded according to the dual standard which
treats plaintiffs and defendants differently, or the evenhanded approach which
treats them the same. The court first examined the language of § 505 which
states in relevant part that "... the court may also award a reasonable attorney's
fee to the prevailing party as part of the costs." 17 U.S.C. § 505. The court held
that on its face, the statute did not indicate that prevailing plaintiffs should be
judged by a different standard than prevailing defendants. It then addressed each
of the arguments offered by the parties.
Fantasy, Inc. first alleged that a Supreme Court precedent supported the appli-
cation of the dual standard in the present case. In Christiansburg Garment Co. v.
EEOC, 434 U.S. 412 (1978), the Supreme Court examined nearly identical fee-
shifting language in Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The provision
states in relevant part that a court "in its discretion, may allow the prevailing
party... a reasonable attorney's fee as part of the costs ...." 42 U.S.C. §
2000e-5(k). The Christiansburg Court held that prevailing plaintiffs should ordi-
narily recover attorneys fees,2 but defendants must show that the action was
frivolous.3 Fantasy argued that the nearly identical language of § 505 of the
Copyright Act should be interpreted similarly to require a dual standard.
However, the Supreme Court rejected this argument because the legislative
history and policy objectives of the Civil Rights Act supported a dual standard,
whereas the history and objectives of the Copyright Act did not. The court ad-
mitted that the legislative history of the fee-shifting language in the Civil Rights
Act was sparse, but pointed out that it did indicate that different standards were
to be applied to successful plaintiffs than to successful defendants.4 By contrast,
the legislative history of § 505 of the Copyright Act merely stated that "Under
section 505 the awarding of costs and attorney's fees are left to the court's dis-
cretion . . . ."' The court concluded that this provided no support for a dual
standard.
The Supreme Court also pointed out that the policy objectives of the two
statutory sections were different. It noted that in the civil rights context, plaintiffs
generally have fewer resources than defendants for litigation. The court stated
that the purpose of the Civil rights fee-shifting statute was to address this imbal-
ance by treating successful plaintiffs more favorably than successful defendants
with respect to awarding attorney's fees. The court noted that by contrast, the
financial resources of plaintiffs who sue for copyright infringement vary greatly.
2. 434 U.S. at 418.
3. 434 U.S. at 421.
4. The Supreme Court did not cite to legislative history for this proposition. -4ogerty v. Fantasy,
Inc., 114 S.Ct. 1023, 1028 (1994).
5. H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, 163 (1976).
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They may be individual artists or major corporations, and so there is no imbal-
ance to be redressed by awarding attorney's fees to prevailing plaintiffs and
prevailing defendants on different bases. The court concluded that the legislative
history and policy objectives of the Civil Rights Act supported a dual standard
interpretation, while the history and objectives of the Copyright Act did not. It
therefore held that these differences justified reading a dual standard into the
Civil Rights Act but not into the Copyright Act.
Fantasy next argued that the dual standard promoted the purposes of the
Copyright Act better than the evenhanded approach. It claimed that by routinely
awarding attorney's fees to successful plaintiffs, courts would encourage the
bringing of meritorious claims of infringement. The court first pointed out that
the goal of the Copyright Act is not simply to encourage meritorious infringe-
ment actions. Rather, its purpose is to enrich the general public through access to
creative works. The court went on to explain that defendants in infringement
actions can contribute to the public enrichment as well. They do so by success-
fully defending their creative works and thereby ensuring that the public will
have access to them. The court concluded that the goals of the Copyright Act are
also promoted by encouraging defendants to litigate their claims. It therefore
rejected Fantasy's argument that the dual standard promoted the purposes of the
Copyright Act better.
Fantasy's final argument claimed that when Congress considered revisions to
the Copyright Act of 1909, it was aware that the attorney's fees provision6 was
uniformly interpreted to require a dual standard. Fantasy claimed that because
Congress carried forth this language into § 505 of the 1976 Act without any
changes, that it ratified the different treatment of successful plaintiffs and
successful defendants.
Fantasy argued that two studies submitted to Congress during the revision
period made legislators aware of the uniform interpretation requiring a dual
standard. The first report by W. Strauss7 concluded that "[t]he cases indicate that
this discretion [to award attorney's fees] has been judiciously exercised by the
courts."8 The court held that such a limited discussion of attorneys fees did not
constitute an endorsement of a dual standard. The second report by R. Brown9
concluded that "the likelihood of getting a fee award is so problematic that it is
not a factor that goes into the decision to settle or litigate."'" It also noted that
its observations about attorney's fees "deterrent effect on ill-founded litigation,
whether by plaintiffs or defendants, is outside the scope of this inquiry." "The
6. § 116 of the Copyright Act of 1909.
7. STUDIES PREPARED FOR SUBCOMMITTEE ON PATENTS. TRADEMARKS AND COPYRIGHTS, 86TH
CONG., 2D SEsS., DAMAGE PROVISIONS OF THE COPYRIGHT LAW 22 (H. Judiciary Comm. Print 1960)
(study by W. Strauss) (hereinafter Strauss Study).
8. Strauss Study, p. 31.
9. STUDIES PREPARED FOR SUBcoMMrrrEE ON PATENTS, TRADEMARKS, AND COPYRIGHTS, 86TH
CONG., 2D SESS., OPERATION OF THE DAMAGE PROVISIONS OF THE COPYRIGHT LAW: AN EXPLOR-
ATORY STUDY 23 (H. Judiciary Comm. Print 1960) (Study of R. Brown) (hereinafter Brown study).
10. d.at 85.
11. Id. at 85-86.
1994]
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court concluded that the Brown Study therefore did not advocate awarding
attorney's fees to prevailing plaintiffs and prevailing defendants on different
bases either. In addition, the court noted that only one pre-1976 case expressly
endorsed a dual standard.'2 The court therefore concluded that Congress could
not have been aware of, nor could it have ratified a dual interpretation of the
attorney's fees provision of the Copyright Act.
The court also addressed Fogerty's claim that § 505 was meant to adopt the
"British Rule," thereby automatically awarding attorneys fees to the prevailing
party regardless whether it was the plaintiff or defendant. It rejected this argu-
ment for two reasons. First, the language of § 505 states that "the court may also
award a reasonable attorney's fees to the prevailing party as part of the costs."
17 U.S.C. § 505. The court noted that the word "may" implies that the court is
to exercise its discretion. Adopting the "British Rule" would eliminate the court's
discretion, and therefore run counter to the language of the statute. Second, the
court noted that in the United States parties bear their own attorney's fees unless
otherwise provided. The court held that Congress would not depart from the
American Rule without more explicit statutory language and legislative comment.
Having rejected the parties arguments for the dual standard and the British
Rule, the court held that prevailing plaintiffs and prevailing defendants shall be
treated alike. The court therefore adopted the evenhanded approach, under which
prevailing parties are awarded attorneys fees only as a matter of the court's
discretion. The court reversed the court of appeals adoption of the dual standard
and remanded the case so the evenhanded approach could be applied.
Judge Thomas wrote a concurring opinion in which he criticized the Supreme
Court's inconsistent interpretation of identical language in Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act and § 505 of the Copyright Act. Thomas argued that the fee-shifting
language in the Civil Rights Act, which states that "the court, in its discretion,
may allow the prevailing party ... a reasonable attorney's fee ... as part of the
costs . . . ." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e5(k), can only be interpreted to require that pre-
vailing plaintiffs and prevailing defendants be treated the same. He noted that the
court did not follow the plain meaning of the language but rather looked to the
legislative history and the policy objectives of the Civil Rights Act to give the
language an interpretation not clearly intended by Congress. Thomas pointed out
that the court's interpretation of the nearly identical language in § 505 of the
Copyright Act, by contrast, followed the plain meaning of the language. None-
theless, Thomas concurred in the judgment because he felt the court's interpreta-
tion of the Copyright Act was correct.
Conclusion
The United States Supreme Court held that prevailing plaintiffs and prevailing
defendants must be treated alike in awarding attorney's fees under the Copyright
Act. It reversed the Ninth Circuit's adoption of the dual standard which awarded
12. Breffort v. I Had a Ball Co., 271 F.Supp. 623 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
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attorney's fees to successful plaintiffs as a matter of course, but required suc-
cessful defendants to show that the original infringement action was frivolous.
The court based its decision on the plain language of § 505 and the lack of sup-
port for a dual standard in the legislative history and policy objectives of the
Act.
Douglas W. Michaud
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